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Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution

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Embedded enemy images are a serious obstacle to conflict management, routinization, reduction, or resolution. Once formed, enemy images tend to become deeply rooted and resistant to change, even when one adversary attempts to signal a change in intent to another. The images themselves then perpetuate and intensify the conflict.

Structural explanations of conflict generally give little attention to the processes that mediate between attributes of the environment and behavior. Rather, they assume that conflict can be explained independently of the images of its participants and their perceptions of threat. However, modern psychology has demonstrated repeatedly that stimulus-response models are inaccurate representations of human behavior. Insofar as the same stimulus is interpreted differently by different individuals or groups, beliefs matter.

The identity of individuals and groups in part shapes how they see the world; the way

people see the world shapes how and when they perceive threat, as well as how they formulate their goals, assess constraints, process information, and choose strategies. Individuals are not passive receptors of environmental stimuli, but they actively construct representations of their environment. The extent of individual and group variation in interpretation suggests that structural explanations of political behavior are rarely determining.

Images of an enemy can form as a response to the persistently aggressive actions of another state or group. These kinds of individual and group images are not the subject of this chapter. A conflict generated by aggressive or militant leaders with vested interests in escalating conflict is generally not amenable to reduction unless intentions change. Therefore, I focus on conflict generated by images that form when the intent of the other is not hostile, when action is ambiguous in an unstructured environment;

I also examine conflict generated by images that were once accurate, but that no longer reflect the intentions of one or more parties. Under these conditions, social-psychological analysis is important both to explain the conflict and to generate prescriptions to reduce its intensity.

The analysis focuses on the images of leaders, but it also examines the roles of elites and publics to analyze the still ill-understood social-psychological processes of the creation, retention, and revision of enemy images by individuals and by groups. In this connection, I pay particular attention to the impact of group identity. I first examine the psychological, social, and political processes that create and reinforce hostile images. In the second part of the chapter, I explore the conditions under which adversarial images are likely to change. To explain the changes in enemy images that facilitate conflict management, routinization, reduction, and resolution, I draw on propositions from social psychology to develop a concept of "trial-and-error learning" from failure, looking particularly at the strategies one adversary can use to promote change of image by another.

IDENTITY AND THE CREATION OF ENEMY IMAGES

An image refers to a set of beliefs or to the hypotheses and theories that an individual or group is convinced are valid. An image includes both experience-based knowledge, and values or beliefs about desirable behavior.¹ When these individual images are shared within a group, they become stereotyped.² A stereotyped image is a group belief about another individual, group, or state that includes descriptive, affective, and normative components. Stereotyped enemy images, generally simple in structure, set the political context in which action takes place

and decisions are made. Converging streams of evidence from social psychology, cultural anthropology, international relations, and comparative politics suggest that individuals and groups are motivated to form and maintain images of an enemy even in the absence of solid evidence confirming hostile intentions.

Enemy images can be a product of the need for identity and the dynamics of group behavior. Social psychologists have identified a fundamental human need for identity. Identity is the way in which a person is, or wishes to be, known by others; it is a conception of self in relation to others. An effective identity includes beliefs and scripts for action in relation to others. An individual almost always holds more than one identity and generally moves freely among these identities, depending on the situation. I, for example, am a mother when I am with my sons, a wife when we visit my in-laws, a teacher with my students, and a scholar with my university colleagues. Individual identity is highly situational and relational.

One important component of individual identity is social identity, or the part of an individual's self-concept that derives from knowledge of his or her membership in a social group or groups, together with the value attached to that membership.³ Social psychologists suggest that people satisfy their need for positive self-identity, status, or reduction of uncertainty by identifying with a group.⁴ These needs then require bolstering and favorable comparison of the "in-group" with "out-groups."⁵ Membership in a group leads to systematic comparison, differentiation, and derogation of other groups.

The most striking finding of social psychologists is that social differentiation occurs even in the absence of material bases for conflict. This need for collective as well as individual identity leads people to differentiate

between "we" and "they," to distinguish between "insiders" and "outsiders," even when scarcity or gain is not an issue. In an effort to establish or defend group identity, groups and their leaders identify their distinctive attributes as virtues and label the distinctiveness of others as vices. This labeling responds to deep social-psychological needs, can lead to the creation of enemy stereotypes, and can culminate in conflict.

A study of massive state repression leading to group extinction, for example, concluded that genocides and politicides are extreme attempts to maintain the security of one identity group at the expense of other groups.⁶ Ethnocentrism, or strong feelings of self-group centrality and superiority, does not necessarily culminate in extreme or violent behavior. It does, however, draw on myths that are central to group or national culture and breeds stereotyping and a misplaced suspicion of others' intentions.⁷

Social identity and differentiation do not, however, inevitably lead to violent conflict.⁸ If they did, conflict would occur at all times, under all conditions. Several important qualifications are necessary before we can address the relationship between identity and violence. First, personal and social identity are often in tension with one another. By identifying strongly with a group, people inevitably deemphasize their individual identity, and those with a strong sense of individual identity give less weight to their group identities. Human rights activists, for example, characteristically identify less with a particular group and more with norms of individual responsibility. People also generally identify with several groups. I am a Torontonian at home, an Ontarian when I travel in Canada, and a Canadian when I travel abroad. People typically identify with a group whose importance is salient in a given situation.⁹

The critical question is under what con-

ditions identity and violent conflict are related. Why are relationships among some groups so much more competitive and violent than among others?¹⁰ Hutus and Tutsis have engaged in violent conflict six times since 1962, while Québécois and Anglophones in Canada—despite important and deep differences between the two groups—have not fought for over two hundred years. Moreover, substantial numbers of Québécois also share multiple identities, including strong and positive identification with Canada. What explains why strong group identity precipitates violent conflict only in some situations?

At least part of the answer lies in the variability of identity. Social identity is not given; it can be chosen freely by an individual, imposed by others who have the authority and resources to do so, or socially constructed through interaction with others.¹¹ Ethnic or national identity intensifies, for example, during periods of social, economic, or political crisis, when it is brokered by leaders who create or reinterpret histories and traditions.¹² Serbian leaders quite deliberately sharpened ethnic differentiation in the period following Marshal Tito's death and the weakening of the state structure.

Conflict does not develop when the sources of identities or the identities themselves are compatible. I experience no conflict, for example, among my multiple identities as a Torontonian, an Ontarian, and a Canadian. When the identity an individual chooses is incompatible with the identity imposed by others or the social context in which identity is constantly being re-created, conflict can develop. Muslims living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, defined themselves as Serbs or Croats until the 1970s, when the Serb and Croat identities began to be re-created to exclude Muslims. Only then did they begin to define themselves as Bosnian Muslims with a

distinct political identity. Even then, however, incompatible political identities may not be sufficient to create violent conflict. To return again to the Canadian example, some Québécois see fundamental incompatibilities with being a Quebecker and a Canadian, but do not consider resorting to force. They do not because they are committed to norms of fairness and due process, and they expect these commitments to be reciprocated by their counterparts in English-speaking Canada.¹³

Conflict can trigger violence among groups under conditions of scarcity. Some evidence suggests that culturally and physically similar groups can generate hostility and aggression toward one another when in competition for scarce resources.¹⁴ Analyses of civil violence also conclude that relative deprivation is the most important condition for participants in collective violence.¹⁵ As the gap grows between material expectations and assets, aggression toward those perceived as the cause of relative deprivation will grow and intensify. Relative deprivation is a useful starting point in explaining the growth of hostile imagery and stereotypes in a state where the economy is declining. Loss aversion is likely to intensify stereotyping: When expectations remain stable, but capabilities decline, people who are experiencing a decline in their assets are especially likely to become angry and to provide fertile ground for imagery that is hostile to another group.¹⁶

Conflicts of identity are particularly acute when group members believe that recognizing another's identity can compromise their own, when they perceive that granting rights to the other is an abdication of their own identity. Throughout much of its history, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been this kind of existential conflict: Because both identities are tied to the same territory, leaders on both sides long felt that acknowledging the other's identity would funda-

mentally compromise their own.¹⁷ In these kinds of existential conflicts over identity, enemy images are easily formed and resistant to change.

COGNITION AND ENEMY IMAGES

Common cognitive biases can also contribute to the creation of enemy images. The egocentric bias leads people to overestimate the extent to which they are the target of others' actions. Leaders are thus likely to see their group or state as the target of the hostility of others even when they are not.

The fundamental attribution error leads people to exaggerate systematically the importance of others' dispositions or fixed attributes in explaining their undesired behavior. Leaders are, therefore, likely to attribute undesirable behavior to the "character" of other groups or states, rather than to the difficulties they face in their environment.¹⁸ Syria's president rarely draws a distinction between Israel's leaders, ignores differences among political parties, explains Israel's behavior as a consequence of its Zionist character, and dismisses the impact of public opinion on the policy of a democratically elected leadership. President Assad consistently exaggerates the "disposition" of Israel's leadership at the expense of the situation it confronts.

Identity and cognitive biases do not always contribute to conflict through stereotyped enemy images. These images are necessary, but insufficient explanations of the formation of enemy images. If they were sufficient, individuals, groups, and states would have strong enemy images all the time. This is clearly not the case. The critical variables are the kinds of environments in which individuals and groups seek to satisfy their needs and the norms that they generate and accept. Certain kinds of international and domestic conditions facilitate the formation of enemy images.¹⁹

THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT

The international environment of states can create conditions in which identity or cognitive biases trigger the creation of enemy images, even in the absence of aggressive behavior by others. The distinguishing characteristic of a "security dilemma" is that behavior perceived by one group or state as threatening and aggressive is actually a defensive response to an inhospitable strategic environment. To enhance their own security, leaders take measures that simultaneously diminish the security of others.²⁰ For forty years, leaders in the Soviet Union and the United States saw their own behavior as a defensive response to the aggressive intentions and actions of the other.²¹ Interpreting a defensive action as offensive can feed and fuel an image of an enemy that is then reinforced over time in a spiraling process of interaction.

The formation of enemy images can also be triggered by domestic factors. Identity conflict is often a competition for ownership of the state and control of its resources. States can stand above and attempt to mediate conflict—for example, by giving representation to different groups as in Belgium—or can be the creature and the instrument of one exclusive group, as in Nigeria where the Hausa Fulani dominate the military regime.²² The expropriation of the identity, symbols, and resources of the state by one group to the exclusion of others is a strong predictor of the likelihood of stereotyping.

Groups and coalitions whose interests are served by conflict abroad or ongoing hostility can capture the political process and propagate enemy images designed to intensify hostility. Entrepreneurial leaders or elites whose domestic support is uncertain or threatened can manipulate identities to bolster political loyalty.²³ To gain public support, parochial interest groups

that benefit from militarist or imperialist policies create strategic rationalizations or "myths." Over time, some elites come to believe the myths that they have learned, making these images extraordinarily resistant to change. A process of mythmaking that perpetuates hostile imagery is most likely in countries, like the former Soviet Union, with concentrated interest groups that trade and logroll.²⁴

Differences in domestic political conditions make some kinds of populations more receptive to elite manipulation than others.²⁵ In controlled political regimes, leaders and elites who dominate the instruments of communication can more easily manipulate identities and mass images. Both the kind of regime and the organization of society affect the creation of hostile imagery. The hallmark of a deeply divided society, one that is likely to sustain significant hostile imagery and experience violent conflict, is the presence of separate structures organized on the basis of identity, structures that infuse every aspect of society. In Lebanon, for example, political offices—from the highest level to the local levels—have traditionally been allocated on the basis of religious identity. In this kind of society, creating and maintaining ethnic stereotypes and enemy images is easy.

Political, economic, and psychocultural factors are relevant to the growth of hostile imagery. The salience and intensity of identity, especially ethnic identity, as social differentiators are critical predictors of stereotyping. Salience and intensity are themselves tied closely to the perceived stakes of ethnic relations.²⁶ The greater the gap between expectations and capabilities, the more important the values that are endangered by declining capabilities, and the smaller the range of other satisfactions that can compensate for the loss in assets, the more receptive populations are to elite attempts to stereotype others.²⁷

This analysis suggests that identity itself is not a cause of stereotyping and violent conflict. Even when competitive identities are present, stereotyping is likely only when it is triggered by the exclusionary acts of leaders, either by monopolizing the resources of the state against groups within their own societies or by pressing claims against those within others. Leaders and elites evoke threats to political identity that then provoke stereotyping and contribute to violence.

THE PERSISTENCE OF ENEMY IMAGES

Once stereotyped images are in place, they are extraordinarily difficult to change. Because enemy images contain an emotional dimension of strong dislike, there is a strong desire to maintain the existing image and little incentive to seek new information about a foe.²⁸ Stereotyped images also generate behavior that is hostile and confrontational, increasing the likelihood that an adversary will respond with hostile action. A cycle of reciprocal behavior then reinforces adversary images by providing allegedly confirming evidence of hostile intentions. Enemy images tend to become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing.²⁹

Enemy images are also the product of deeply rooted social and psychological needs and frequently serve the interests of important groups and elites. Consequently they become central and well-embedded within larger belief systems. Research has established at least three different schemas of enemies: imperials, barbarians, and degenerates.³⁰ For example, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet leadership saw the United States as an "imperial" enemy; Chinese leaders have at times stereotyped others as "barbarians"; and the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran described western leaders as "degenerates." Many other examples could be cited.

Theories of cognitive consistency expect that the least central parts of a belief system—that is, those with the fewest interdependent cognitions—will change first. Central beliefs are generally most resistant to change; people tend to modify at the margin and to change peripheral beliefs first.³¹ In the process of making inferences, people seek to maintain their beliefs by reducing the challenge of discrepant information. The well-established tendency to discount inconsistent information contributes significantly to the persistence of stereotypes.³² When people receive discrepant information, they generally make the smallest possible change in their beliefs; they will change their beliefs incrementally, allowing a large number of exceptions and special cases and making superficial alterations, rather than changing their central beliefs. Indeed, exposure to contradictory information frequently results in the strengthening of beliefs.³³ When the Soviet leadership cut defense spending, for example, John Foster Dulles explained that they did so out of weakness rather than from any intention to prevent a spiraling arms race. People also tend to actively seek and interpret information that confirms the negative image.³⁴

Cognitive psychology has identified a number of heuristics, or mental rules of thumb, that can make enemy images resistant to change even in the face of discrepant information.³⁵ They describe how individuals process information, using convenient shortcuts. Two of the best-documented heuristics are availability and representativeness.³⁶ The availability heuristic posits that people tend to interpret new information in terms of what is most easily available in their cognitive repertoire, that is, in light of what they already know.³⁷ An enemy image is usually easily available and salient. The heuristic of representativeness suggests that people are likely to exaggerate similarities between one event and a prior class of

events.³⁸ When action is ambiguous, people tend to treat it as representative of earlier hostile behavior.

IMAGE CHANGE

Stability in enemy images is the default and change the exception. Yet conservatism does not hold unconditionally. Belief systems and schemata, the active reconstruction of experience at a higher level of abstraction, also change, at times dramatically. Psychological, social, and political variables affect the propensity of change in enemy images.

Change in images is partly a function of the rate at which discrepant information occurs. Cognitive psychologists identify several factors that facilitate change. They suggest that important beliefs can change dramatically when there is no other way to account for "large" amounts of contradictory data.³⁹ Greater change will occur when information arrives in large batches, rather than bit by bit. President Bush, for example, did not change his image of Gorbachev even though the Soviet leader made a series of unilateral gestures to the United States. Only when information about large changes arrived in a rush, did he finally alter his well-established image of the Soviet leader.

Significant change in beliefs about others also occurs when people are exposed to inconsistent information and are persuaded that the behavior is not an arbitrary response to their environment but reflects the "nature" of the others.⁴⁰ Croatian and Muslim leaders are unlikely, for example, to change their image of Serbians if they attribute change in Serbian policy to their military setback by the Croatian forces in Krajina. The social and political conditions that promote uncharacteristic attributions to dispositional rather than situational factors have not been satisfactorily identified.⁴¹

Images can also change incrementally over time. As people consider information

about an adversary inconsistent with their previous knowledge, they incorporate into their belief the conditions under which the image does not hold. This kind of process permits gradual change and adjustment.⁴² When controlled political systems become more open or as leaders and elites receive new information about their rival, their image of the "other" can change incrementally.

Cognitive explanations of image change pay insufficient attention to the emotional factors that can motivate—or inhibit—change. Not only "cold" cognition but also "hot" emotions affect the likelihood of image change. The lower the intensity of an emotional commitment to an identity and its associated images, the less resistant these images are to change in the face of contradictory information.⁴³

Most theories of social cognition do not adequately specify the external conditions or mediating causes of any of these changes.⁴⁴ Critics rightly contend that the neglect of context is disturbing; the social in "social" cognition research is largely absent.⁴⁵ Theories of social cognition do not explicitly model the processes that link changes in the environment to cognitive constructs or explain how images change. They do not examine the political and social interests with a stake in change, nor do they explore the social configurations that promote change in group images. Until they do, theories of social cognition will remain an inadequate theoretical tool in the analysis of change in enemy images.

POLITICAL LEARNING

To explain the changes in enemy images that facilitate conflict management, routinization, reduction, and resolution, I draw on propositions from social psychology to develop a concept of trial-and-error learning from failure. Learning is a subset of cognitive change; not all change is learning,

but all learning is change. Learning is an explicitly normative concept: It measures cognitive change against some set of explicit criteria.

There is as yet no unified theory of learning, and psychology has not identified the conditions or thresholds that predict when different forms of learning are likely to occur. Furthermore, most psychological theories of learning are not very useful in specifying the dynamics of learning, in large part because they analyze learning within highly structured environments. Learning theories in educational and experimental psychology are associationist. They treat learning as a change in the probability of a specified response in the face of changing reward contingencies.⁴⁶ This concept of learning is not helpful in social and political environments where appropriate responses are unknown or disputed.

Political psychologists distinguish between simple and complex learning. Learning is simple when means are better adjusted to ends. Complex learning occurs when people develop more differentiated images and when these images are integrated into higher order structures that highlight difficult trade-offs.⁴⁷ Complex learning, at its highest level, may lead to a reordering or a redefinition of goals. From this perspective, learning must include the development of more complex structures as well as changes in content.⁴⁸

These concepts of learning are a useful approach to explaining changes in hostile images that then shape or permit new directions in policy, but they fail to distinguish change from learning. Without some evaluative criteria, any cognitive change can be considered learning, and the concept of learning becomes redundant. Change in cognitive content or structure does not always constitute the "learning" that is necessary for conflict reduction. Saddam Hussein, for example, in the year preceding his

decision to invade Kuwait, simplified his schema and concluded that the United States was engaged in a conspiracy to undermine his regime. Since the United States had no intention of undermining his regime and took no action to do so, this cognitive change is more accurately characterized as paranoid thinking that led to escalation of conflict.⁴⁹ Although these changes in Saddam's schema do provide a powerful explanation of his foreign policy behavior, they cannot, however, be considered learning.⁵⁰ Inescapably built into the concept of political learning is an evaluation of the structure and content of cognitive change.⁵¹ These kinds of evaluative judgments inevitably are and will be contested.

More helpful are several strands of social-psychological theory and research that examine the liabilities of success and the benefits of failure in promoting organizational learning.⁵² When failure challenges the status quo, it can draw attention to problems and stimulate the search for solutions. Only certain kinds of failure promote learning—highly predictable failures provide no new information, but unanticipated failures that challenge old ways of representing problems are more likely to stimulate new formulations. When Bosnian Serb forces suffered an unexpected and humiliating military defeat at the hands of Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic moved vigorously to push a reformulated policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Responding to failure, leaders "learn through experimentation" rather than through more traditional patterns of avoidance.⁵³

Learning through failure can provoke a series of sequential experiments that generate quick feedback and allow a new round of trial-and-error experimentation.⁵⁴ This trial-and-error model of learning captures the dynamics of social cognition far more effectively than cognitive theories in which the perceiver is a "passive onlooker, who

doesn't *do* anything—doesn't mix it up with the folks he's watching, never tests his judgments in action or interaction."⁵⁵ It does not represent learning as a neat linear process with clear causal antecedents, but as a messy, dynamic, interactive social, organizational, and political process.

In the text below, I first examine the internal conditions that can promote learning by one adversary. For present purposes, I define learning as changes in enemy images that promote conflict management, routinization, reduction, and resolution. I then explore the strategies that leaders or groups can use to promote the kinds of changes in their adversary's image of themselves that can lead to a reduction in conflict. The distinction between internal and external stimuli to learning and change in enemy image is artificial, since the process is usually highly interactive, but it is convenient for analytic purposes.

Former presidents Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union are two outstanding examples of political learning. Both developed far more complex and differentiated images of their adversary and initiated a series of actions that triggered a process of conflict reduction.⁵⁶ Changes in the images of their adversary led to changes in behavior that in turn provoked further changes in their enemy images. Learning accelerated in the doing.

To develop a satisfactory explanation of image change through political learning, we need to identify the conditions and strategies that promote learning. One obvious explanation is the change in the international distribution of capabilities—the relative decline in Egyptian and Soviet capabilities as compared to Israel and the United States, respectively. If changes in Egyptian and Soviet enemy images are a straightforward response to structural changes in the international system, then the analysis of political dynamics and image

change is unnecessary. If, on the other hand, there were important divisions within the Egyptian and Soviet leadership, and interpretations of the environment were contested, then structural factors alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation of the change in Egyptian and Soviet concepts. In both Egypt in the mid-1970s and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, there were deep divisions within the leadership. New interpretations of their environments were bitterly contested. It is therefore unsatisfying to explain the changes in Egyptian and Soviet images of their adversaries as rational adaptation to unambiguous feedback from their environments.⁵⁷

Social and political factors can also be important triggers of image change and political learning.⁵⁸ Shifting political coalitions can be a powerful explanation of image change if new leaders are chosen primarily because of the content of their beliefs. In these two cases, however, both Sadat and Gorbachev struggled to shape coalitions to support policies that flowed from their changed images; new coalitions did not demand changes toward their adversary from their leader.

Generational change and political succession can also explain a fundamental change in leaders' images; the source of change is not individual learning but a change in elites. Generational change is helpful but not entirely satisfactory as an explanation of image change in the Soviet Union, and it is irrelevant in Egypt. Gorbachev was a generation younger than Brezhnev and many of his colleagues, but many in Gorbachev's generation did not change.⁵⁹ In Egypt, Sadat was of the same generation as Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Sadat learned after he had been president for several years.

Political succession and domestic politics are helpful in explaining whose images prevail under what set of political conditions. Shifts in social structure and political power

determine whether leaders can implement policies based on changed images. However, they do not and cannot address the important question of why Gorbachev and Sadat began to "think" differently about conflict and how and why they changed their images and developed new concepts to organize their thinking about foreign and defense policy.

WHY LEADERS LEARN

The changes in Gorbachev's and Sadat's images of their adversary suggest two conditions that motivated political learning.⁶⁰ The first condition was the importance of domestic reform to both men. Gorbachev came to office committed to domestic restructuring of a largely stalemated economic and political system. Gorbachev quickly learned that future resource commitments implicit in the standing threat assessments of the Soviet military would seriously constrain economic restructuring at home.⁶¹

Anwar Sadat similarly was motivated by his domestic agenda. After the October war in 1973, Sadat gave new importance to the role of the private and the foreign sectors, which were expected to provide both finance and technology. The new economic strategy of quasi-liberal experimentation was consistent with Sadat's strategy of conflict reduction: Stabilizing of Egypt's security environment was essential if the capital and investment necessary to push the economy forward were to flow into Egypt.

A second factor common to both leaders was their prior experience of the failure of alternatives to accommodation. Even before he became general-secretary, Gorbachev invited experts from the Foreign Ministry and the Academy of Sciences to private discussions of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. He was told of the growing costs of the Soviet intervention and its poor prospects; Afghanistan was the Soviet "Vietnam."⁶²

Many also argued that NATO's deployment of Pershing II missiles had been provoked by Moscow's deployment of highly accurate intermediate range nuclear systems.⁶³ Stimulated by the failures in the Soviet economy, in policy in Afghanistan, and in arms control, Gorbachev learned through extensive consultation with specialists and experts and through trial-and-error experimentation.⁶⁴

Sadat also learned from failure. Both he and Egyptian generals recognized that Egypt had fought the war in 1973 under optimal conditions: A military alliance with Syria had permitted a coordinated two-front attack for the first time, Arab oil producers had joined in the accompanying diplomatic offensive, and Egypt had the strategic advantage of surprise. Yet even under those conditions, Egypt had come perilously close to a serious military defeat after important initial military successes in crossing the Suez Canal. In the years following that war, Sadat had expanded the gains he had made through a process of phased disengagement with Israel. In this context, he was reluctant to risk the limited gains he had achieved in renewed warfare.

In both cases, failure of earlier policies underlined asymmetric capabilities and unfavorable trends. The evidence suggests that both leaders were motivated to learn and to change their images of their adversary. Both searched for new information: Gorbachev from experts in academic institutes and government and from American interlocutors, and Sadat through intermediaries and then through secret meetings between high-level Egyptian and Israeli leaders. Both leaders were receptive to the information that they received, largely because they were motivated to change existing images and policies. Both began with a small change in image, moved tentatively to small actions, accepted feedback, learned, and initiated a new series of actions that generated further feedback and change.⁶⁵ Gorbachev and

Sadat ultimately became confident that their adversaries would reciprocate their acts of reassurance. Learning was not orderly and linear, but experimental, through trial and error. In both cases, enemy images changed as a result of a complex interactive relationship between political learning and action that provided quick feedback.

Gorbachev and Sadat were motivated to change their images of their adversaries by their interest in freeing resources for domestic reform and by the earlier failure of alternatives to accommodation. These two stimuli to learning are not easily manipulated by others from the outside. They were the cumulative result of long-standing trends in Soviet and Egyptian domestic and foreign policy. Although this kind of fundamental learning is not necessary for crisis management or the routinization of conflict, it is an essential precondition of conflict reduction and resolution. Fundamental learning encouraged both Gorbachev and Sadat to use strategies of reassurance to initiate a process of conflict reduction.

STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND REDUCTION

Hostile imagery must change if conflict is to be reduced and resolved. Interstate conflict has been managed and routinized without modification in elite, much less public images, but neither civil violence nor interstate conflict can be resolved unless images change and leaders and publics learn. The process must also be reciprocated: Once leaders or groups begin to change their image of their adversary and are interested in attempting to resolve their conflict, they must change the image their adversary has of them if conflict reduction is to make any progress.

When leaders recognize that misperception and stereotyping govern their adversary's judgments as well as their own, they can try, by making an irrevocable commit-

ment, to reassure their adversary of their benign intentions and to create incentives for conflict reduction.⁶⁶ This is precisely the strategy adopted by President Sadat in 1977.⁶⁷ Dissatisfied with the progress of negotiations in the autumn of 1977, yet unprepared to accept the status quo, Sadat searched for a dramatic move that would both reduce the tension and distrust between Egypt and Israel and induce Israel to make major concessions to reduce the conflict. It was the distrust built up over decades, he argued, that constrained the attempt to negotiate the issues at stake and fueled the cycle of wars. Sadat began secret negotiations between Egypt's deputy prime minister and Israel's foreign minister in Morocco; each agreed to make a critical concession—Israel indicated its willingness to return most of the Sinai peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty, and Egypt agreed to peace and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.⁶⁸ Although these proposals were not fully satisfactory to either party, both sides were assured that their concessions would be reciprocated rather than exploited. Shortly thereafter, Sadat went to Jerusalem and spoke to the Knesset of the Egyptian terms for peace. Egyptian demands were unchanged, but Israel's leaders and public paid attention to the irreversible deed rather than to the content of the words. Through this single, dramatic act of reassurance, Sadat changed the trajectory of the conflict by changing his image both among the elite and the public in Israel.

Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem challenged the most important set of beliefs about Arab goals among Israel's leadership and public. His visit provided the dramatic evidence that was needed to overcome deeply entrenched enemy images. A broad spectrum of Israelis had assumed that Arab leaders were unrelentingly hostile, so much so that they were unprepared to meet Israel's leaders face-to-face. Once these core

beliefs were shaken and Israel's identity was acknowledged, it became easier for Israelis to begin to revise associated assumptions and expectations.

President Sadat spoke over the heads of Israel's leadership directly to Israel's public. With his flair for the dramatic, he created the psychological and political symbols that would mobilize public opinion to press their more cautious and restrained leaders. In so doing, he removed a constraint on Israel's leaders and created a political inducement to action. Public learning, far more than elite learning, seems to require a dramatic and irrevocable demonstration of an adversary's benign intentions. Elites are more likely to learn incrementally, as they focus their attention on changing information over time. The public only selectively focuses its attention and is likely to be more resistant to gradual learning. Public opinion did change in Israel in response to a highly visible, unexpected, dramatic action.

Under this very special set of conditions, reassurance through irrevocable commitment succeeded brilliantly. The two critical components that make an irrevocable commitment reassuring to an adversary are its obviously high cost to the leaders who issue the commitment and its irreversibility. The strategy has been used so infrequently because it is often very difficult and very risky to design a commitment that is both high in cost and irreversible.⁶⁹ Leaders frequently have neither the resources nor the information necessary to make irrevocable commitments. In attempting to change an adversary's image through a self-binding commitment, leaders face a difficult trade-off; they are more likely to make offers that are reversible and less costly, but reversible low-cost offers are far less likely to lead to fundamental change in an adversary's image.

Reassurance through irrevocable commitment also requires a degree of freedom

from domestic political and bureaucratic constraints. In Egypt after the 1973 War, Sadat had great autonomy in decision making and, indeed, could withstand the resignation of his foreign minister. Even so, making an irrevocable commitment to leaders long identified as antagonists can be difficult to justify to the public. Yet it is the public nature of the commitment that contributes to its irreversibility and credibility.⁷⁰ For all these reasons, the making of self-binding commitments to jolt an adversary to change its image and learn is likely to be difficult.

When a strategy of irrevocable commitment is impossible, one strategy that builds in some opportunity for learning is an adapted version of graduated reduction in international tension (GRIT).⁷¹ The initiator announces in advance that it is beginning a series of conciliatory actions designed to reduce conflict and then implements these actions whether or not the other side reciprocates. Such actions should be easily verifiable. As each step is implemented, the initiator invites its adversary to reciprocate, but does not specify the appropriate response. Furthermore, a reciprocal response by an adversary is rewarded by a somewhat more conciliatory action. These actions, however, should not impair the defensive capacity of the initiator. If the other side attempts to exploit the concession, the initiator should respond with an appropriate action, but only to the degree necessary to restore the status quo.

Experimental studies concur that strategies like GRIT, which build in a series of conciliatory initiatives taken independently of the other's actions, are more effective than strategies that reciprocate directly and immediately.⁷² Moreover, they were as effective among players who were judged generally competitive by their previous actions as among those who were generally cooperative. A second effective approach is a reciprocal strategy that is slow to retaliate and

slow to return to conciliation; this variant of reciprocity makes allowances for initial misperception and modest learning.⁷³

The experimental evidence may be overly optimistic when action occurs outside the laboratory. Gorbachev went far beyond a graduated strategy of reciprocity as he attempted to change American images of the Soviet Union. In 1985, he initiated a series of unilateral conciliatory actions and persisted even when they were not reciprocated.⁷⁴ Despite this series of unilateral Soviet actions, many in Washington resisted changing their images of the Soviet Union and remained skeptical of Gorbachev's intentions.⁷⁵ Paradoxically, it was Gorbachev who "learned by doing" in a complex interactive relationship between beliefs and behavior—action led to further changes in his beliefs as he made inferences from his behavior about his convictions.⁷⁶ Large and significant amounts of discrepant information were necessary before American leaders changed their image of the Soviet Union. It took Soviet tolerance of the destruction of the Berlin Wall, a dramatic and irreversible signal, to change American images and provoke fundamental learning.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of Gorbachev's and Sadat's policies suggests that strategies of conflict resolution that focus only on competing interests are likely to be insufficient to stimulate the learning that is fundamental to changing hostile imagery. In both enduring interstate rivalries and bitter ethnic conflict, interests are shaped by images, which are in turn partially shaped by identity. What we see as a threat is a function in large part of the way we see the world and who we think we are. Serbian memories of Croatian attacks during World War II and "betrayal" by the great powers—their identity as victims in a hostile world—shape the way leaders define their interests and help explain the continu-

ing support by Croats for leaders and policies that impose terrible costs.

If threatened identities facilitate the creation of hostile imagery and contribute to violent conflict, then securing these identities must be a fundamental component of conflict resolution. If they are to be effective, peacemakers who confront bitter civil wars or enduring interstate rivalries must address interests in the broader context of images and identity. In the former Yugoslavia, the conflict can be managed temporarily by territorial partition and safe havens, but only temporarily. The conflict can be resolved only if all the parties recognize the legitimacy and the permanence of the others' identities. President Sadat's recognition of Israel's legitimacy was the critical key that unlocked the long and difficult peace process that culminated in mutual recognition by Israel and the Palestinians of the legitimacy of the other's identity.

In conflicts between states, reciprocal recognition of legitimacy and renunciation of the use of force can most directly secure threatened identities and reshape interests. In civil conflicts, the challenge is the same but the strategies must be somewhat different. Fractured states can be reconstructed through political separation and mutual recognition of competing identities, through a consociational or group building-block approach (where elite leaders accommodate and groups remain distinct), or through an integrative approach that seeks to forge multi-ethnic coalitions with cross-cutting ties.⁷⁷

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized in the last years of his life that there could be no military solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and he made the fundamental decision to recognize the political identity of Palestinians. He began by negotiating with Palestinian leaders from the West Bank and Gaza, but he concluded that they did not have sufficient authority to make peace. He was reluctant

to negotiate with Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), because he was pessimistic that the two could find an acceptable settlement. Rabin nevertheless allowed his foreign minister, Shimon Peres, to explore through a private channel the possibility that Arafat would agree to a gradual, incremental process that would allow Israel to test the intentions of the PLO in exchange for recognition of the political identity of the Palestinians and the creation of the Palestine National Authority. Critical to the process was mutual recognition of identity and political separation of the two peoples. Over time, secured identities should reshape images and interests as the two peoples disengage and redefine their political, economic, and national frontiers.

Mutual recognition and political separation is the most far-reaching strategy of conflict reduction. In 1989, after a brutal civil war that lasted over a decade, leaders of Lebanese religious groups modified the fundamentals of their prewar consociational bargain. Instead of privileging the Maronite Christian community, Muslims and Christians now share power equally. The arrangement still provides for a Maronite Christian president, a Sunni Muslim prime minister, and a Shiite president of the National Assembly; political decisions are still made by leaders at the top while their communities remain distinct.

The forging of multi-ethnic coalitions with cross-cutting ties is yet another strategy. This has been the traditional strategy in India and Canada, for example, and it was the principal demand of the Muslim leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement reached in Dayton honors a multi-ethnic Bosnia in principle, but its political arrangements provide for de facto separation of Bosnian Serbs from Muslims and Croats. In Canada, an intense political debate now rages between those who argue

that a multicultural and multi-ethnic coalition is the only approach that recognizes the plurality of identities in Canada and those who insist that formal recognition of the distinctiveness of Québécois identity and political restructuring of Canada is essential.

In all these cases, conflict reduction required more than reciprocating small concessions in a gradually building process. The core of the solution lies in the often-difficult decision by senior leaders to acknowledge, respect, and accommodate different identities and to share political power. Informal track-two diplomacy (privately mediated diplomacy among elites closely connected to political leaders) can facilitate the discussion of deep identity issues in parallel with the more formal negotiation of interests that are gradually redefined after identities are recognized. The international community can facilitate power-sharing arrangements by tying progress in conflict resolution to the broader range of issues associated with membership in good standing in the global community.

All these strategies assume that identities are fixed and that they must be accommodated as they are. Such a pessimistic assumption is unwarranted. I have argued that identity is not given, but that it is socially reconstructed as interactions develop and contexts evolve. In his brilliant analysis, Benedict Anderson observed that nations, unlike families and clans where individuals can know the others, are "imagined communities," whose past, tradition, and connections are interpreted and reinterpreted through time.⁷⁸ Political identities similarly depend on imagined communities whose traditions are constructed and reinterpreted. Identities can therefore be reshaped and reconfigured as leaders and communities restructure their relationships.

Identities are complex structures, with components that emphasize shared communitarian traditions and norms that usually

emphasize protection of the weak, social responsibility, generosity, fairness, and reciprocity as well as honor, reputation, and vengeance. The emphasis given to these different norms varies with the situation. Skilled mediators can emphasize the positive values of responsibility, fairness, and compassion as important elements of honor and reputation. Appeal to the "best" in the tradition of an identity may shift the emphasis within an "imagined community" to create the space for fairness and reciprocity that can ultimately change images, reshape interests, and culminate in tolerance and recognition of others' identities.

Threatened identities are conducive to hostile imagery, incompatible definitions of interest, and violent conflict. Often, violent conflict escalates to a painful level of destruction before serious attempts at conflict management (much less conflict resolution) begin. Yet defeat and destruction are extraordinarily expensive teaching tools. In their wake, deep enmity can preclude the fundamental learning that is necessary for image change and tolerance of the identities of others. Only after repeated failures do the parties begin to negotiate the issues, and then usually at only a superficial level. The challenge for peacemaking in the twenty-first century is to engage the parties earlier and at a deeper level so that the identities of some can be stretched to tolerate the identities of others.

NOTES

1. Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 5; and Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 114-127.

2. Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological

Perspective," *Mershon International Studies Review* (1994): 38, 43-68.

3. Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 255.

4. Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams, "Toward a Single-Process Uncertainty-Reduction Model of Social Motivation in Groups," in *Group Motivation: Social Psychological Perspectives*, ed. Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 173-190.

5. Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 2nd ed., ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7-24; Michael Hogg, *The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Marilyn B. Brewer and Sherry K. Schneider, "Social Identity and Social Dilemmas: A Double-Edged Sword," in *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances*, ed. Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 169-184; and David Messick and Diane Mackie, "Intergroup Relations," *Annual Review of Psychology* 40 (1989): 45-81.

6. Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 359-371.

7. K. Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

8. Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization* 49 (Spring 1995): 229-252, argues that social identity theory confirms the neorealist argument that an anarchic international environment produces self-help behavior. Mercer does acknowledge, however, that the impact of differentiation on military conflict will depend on political, economic, and historical factors.

9. John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and

Margaret S. Wetherwell, *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

10. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see James M. Goldgeier, "The Role of Political Psychology in Rethinking Security Studies," unpublished paper.

11. Ted Hopf, "Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan," unpublished paper.

12. T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

13. For a discussion of how moral norms and obligations that prevail in primary groups are reinterpreted at the national level, see Paul Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?" *Political Psychology* 16, no. 2 (1995): 217-235.

14. Muzafer Sherif, *In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). The impact of "relative deprivation," or a context in which all groups stand to lose but some groups stand to lose more than others, is disputed.

15. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 12-13.

16. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, pp. 46-50. For a discussion of loss aversion and its impact on cooperation, see Janice Gross Stein and Louis Pauly, eds., *Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

17. Herbert C. Kelman, "Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 1 (March 1982): 39-76.

18. Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1984), pp. 72-99.

19. D. M. Taylor and F. M. Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International and Social Psychological Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

20. They are likely to do so when geography is harsh and provides no buffer zone or margin for error; when offensive and defensive technology are difficult to distinguish; and when the rel-

ative power balance between adversaries is changing so that for at least one of the two, the advantages of striking first are substantial. See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (1978): 167-214.

21. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

22. Paul Brass, ed., *Ethnic Groups and the State* (Towota, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995); and Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

23. Human Rights Watch, in a report issued in 1995, concluded that "time after time, a proximate cause of violence is governmental exploitation of communal differences. . . . The 'communal card' is frequently played, for example, when a government is losing popularity or legitimacy and finds it convenient to wrap itself in the cloak of ethnic, racial, or religious rhetoric." *Playing the Communal Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), p. viii.

24. Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 2-6, 31-49.

25. Goldgeier, "The Role of Political Psychology in Rethinking Security Studies," incisively reviews the social psychological literature on this question.

26. Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994) and "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 4 (1986): 395-418.

27. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 59.

28. Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty," p. 63.

29. Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), pp. 117-118.

30. Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivations: A General Theory and a Case Study* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Richard Herrmann, *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); Herrmann,

"The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences about Perceptions," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): 175-203; and Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 415-450.

31. J. R. Anderson, *The Architecture of Cognition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).

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33. E. R. Hirt and S. J. Sherman, "The Role of Prior Knowledge in Explaining Hypothetical Events," *Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology* 21 (1985): 519-543.

34. Pruitt and Rubin, *Social Conflict*, pp. 112-119.

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36. When people "anchor," they estimate the magnitude or degree of a phenomenon by picking an "available" initial value as a reference point and making a comparison. Fiske and Taylor, *Social Cognition*, pp. 250-256, 268-275.

37. Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, "Ego-centric Biases in Availability and Attribution," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 37 (1979): 322-336.

38. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction," *Psychological Review* 80 (1973): 237-251.

39. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 288-318.

40. Jennifer Crocker, Darlene B. Hannah, and Renee Weber, "Person Memory and Causal Attributions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44, no. 1 (1983): 55-66.

41. Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attri-

bution Process," in *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology* 10, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 174-220.

42. E. T. Higgins and J. A. Bargh, "Social Cognition and Social Perception," in *Annual Review of Psychology* 38, ed. M. R. Rosenzweig and L. W. Porter (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, 1987): 369-425.

43. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, p. 136.

44. An exception is Ralph Erber and Susan T. Fiske, "Outcome Dependency and Attention to Inconsistent Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 47 (1984): 709-726.

45. James H. Kuklinski, Robert C. Luskin, and John Bolland, "Where is the Schema? Going Beyond the 'S' Word in Political Psychology," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1341-1380.

46. T. L. Good and J. E. Brophy, *Educational Psychology: A Realistic Approach* (New York: Longman, 1990).

47. Ernest Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 84.

48. See, for example, Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*.

49. In an effort to deal with the problem of evaluation, analysts refer to pathological learning, or changes that impede future cognitive growth. See James Clay Moltz, "Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform," *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (January 1993): 301-325.

50. See Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf: A Failed or Impossible Task?" *International Security* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 147-179.

51. For a similar argument, see George W. Breslauer, "What Have We Learned About Learning?" in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 825-856.

52. Sim B. Sitkin, "Learning Through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 14 (1992): 231-266.

53. D. T. Campbell, "Reform as Experiments," *American Psychologist* 24 (1969): 409-429.

54. See C. Argyis and D. A. Schon, *Organizational Learning* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

55. Ulric Neisser, "On 'Social Knowing,'" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 6 (1980): 603-604, cited in Kuklinski et al., "Where is the Schema?" p. 1346.

56. The scope of their learning is detailed in Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as an Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in *International Relations Theory and the Transformation of the International System*, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 223-258, and "The Political Economy of Strategic Agreements: The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobsen, and Robert Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 77-103.

57. Steven Weber, "Interactive Learning in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control," in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. Breslauer and Tetlock, pp. 784-824.

58. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*.

59. For evidence of how politically contested much of Gorbachev's "new thinking" was, see Stephen M. Meyer, "Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 124-163.

60. Richard Ned Lebow, "When Does Conciliation Succeed?" in *International Relations Theory and the Transformation of the International System*, ed. Lebow and Risse-Kappen, pp. 167-186.

61. Meyer, "Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security."

62. Interview of Vadim Zagladin, Moscow, May 18, 1989, and Anatoliy Gromyko, Moscow, May 19, 1989.

63. See Robert Herman, "Soviet New Thinking: Ideas, Interests, and the Definition of Security" (doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1995).

64. Stein, "Political Learning by Doing."

65. See Stein, "The Political Economy of Strategic Agreements," and "Political Learning by Doing."

66. Dean G. Pruitt and Peter J. Carnevale, *Negotiation in Social Conflict* (London: Open University Press, 1992), p. 146, term this kind of strategy "unilateral conciliatory initiatives."

67. Z. Maoz and D. S. Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments: The Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (1987): 177-200.

68. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Knopf, 1981), pp. 44-52.

69. Maoz and Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments," p. 198.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.

71. Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

72. S. Lindsfold, P. S. Walters, and H. Koutsourais, "Cooperators, Competitors, and Response to GRIT," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (1983): 521-532.

73. D. G. Pruitt and M. J. Kimmel, "Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming," *Annual Review of Psychology* 28 (1977): 363-392.

74. In 1985, Gorbachev announced the suspension of Soviet countermeasures in response to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) by NATO and a moratorium on further deployments of SS-20s. That same year, he proclaimed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The Soviet Union also paid its back dues to the United Nations for peacekeeping, began to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and reworked its position in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in October 1985. In January 1986, Gorbachev urged a program of complete nuclear disarmament to be achieved in three stages by the year 2000. In 1987, the Soviet Union agreed to intrusive on-site verification inspections as part of the INF agreement and announced its decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. In December 1988, at the UN General Assembly,

Gorbachev also announced the unilateral reduction of active Soviet military forces by 15 percent and the withdrawal of more than 40 percent of Soviet tank divisions from Eastern Europe, together with 50 percent of Soviet tanks.

75. Interviews, Policy Planning Staff and National Security Council Staff, Washington, February 1989.

76. M. P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, and R. H. Fazio, "Attitude-Behavior Consistency: An In-

dividual Difference Perspective," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 38 (1980): 432-440.

77. Timothy D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

78. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991).