

Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida, who denounced the innovations and schisms (notably the Sunni-Shiite divide) within the Muslim community as perversions of Islam. Salafists demand a return to the pure form of Islam as practiced by the prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors. Over the past two centuries, the Salafi movement has evolved, split, and adapted to differing circumstances throughout the Muslim world. Salafists do not necessarily call for the use of violence; some focus almost exclusively on social behavior, calling for an ultraconservative moral code to direct dress and other social practices. However, a violent/extremist branch of the movement combines the missionary zeal associated with the call to purge Islam of its impure elements with the violent anti-Western extremism incubated among jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Sources on the Salafist/jihadist ideology include Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad," *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 4 (December 2001): 18-38; Christopher M. Blanchard, *Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 4, 2005); Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002); and Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

9. For example, in February 2005, London's Finsbury Park mosque, once a bastion of radicalism, was reclaimed. A new board of directors ousted the mosque's radical cleric, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and literally changed the locks. See Lizette Alvarez,

"Britain's Mainstream Muslims Find Voice," *New York Times*, March 6, 2005. Similarly, measures must be taken within prison systems to curtail and ultimately cease recruitment. See Ian Cuthbertson, "Prisons and the Education of Terrorists," *World Policy Journal* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 20, for specific recommendations.

10. Alvarez, "Britain's Mainstream Muslims Find Voice." Mainstream Muslims in Britain have also taken steps to isolate Islamist militants and strengthen ties between moderates and the British establishment.

11. See David E. Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 25, 2005.

12. See James Brandon, "Koranic Duel Eases Terror," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 2005.

13. Sabrina Tavernise, "Marines See Signs Iraq Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters," *New York Times*, June 21, 2005.

14. See Matt Bai, "The Framing Wars," *New York Times Magazine*, July 12, 2005. See also Bettancourt et al., "The Power of a Good Idea," 10.

15. In Jordan, for example, a broad curriculum review is taking place that emphasizes more moderate and progressive interpretations of Islam. See Hassan M. Fattah, "Jordan Is Preparing to Tone Down the Islamic Bombast in Textbooks," *New York Times*, June 12, 2005. A number of European governments are also exploring options for having greater influence over the training of imams who preach in European mosques. See Elaine Sciolino, "Europe Struggling to Train New Breed of Muslim Clerics," *New York Times*, October 18, 2004.

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INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS ARE FREQUENTLY the subject of third-party mediation. Mediation is as old as history (the earliest recorded occurrence comes from some thirty-five hundred years ago); it was practiced in *Romeo and Juliet* with catastrophic effects and has been part of diplomacy since the establishment of the state system in 1648.¹ It remains crucial in the present post-Cold War, post-9/11 era. Although the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, had a major impact on international relations, half a decade later no significant changes are discernible in the nature and practice of international mediation.

"Conflict" here refers to politico-security issues. Typically, in international economic or environmental disputes, rival parties are not as forcefully competitive nor are the means of conducting the dispute as violent as in politico-security conflicts. Conflicts over politico-security issues take place within a context of power politics, which has a major effect on international mediation. This premise provides the conceptual underpinning of our analysis

of the participants' motives in mediation, the conditions that affect the performance and roles of mediators, and the keys to effective mediation of international conflicts. The term "international conflict" refers here both to interstate conflicts and to domestic ones where external parties are involved through political, economic, or military assistance or asylum and bases for the domestic actors.

Mediation is a form of third-party intervention in a conflict. It differs from other forms of third-party intervention in conflicts in that it is not based on the direct use of force and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants to win. Its purpose is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable to both sides and consistent with the third party's interests. Mediation is a political process with no advance commitment from the parties to accept the mediator's ideas. In this respect, it differs from arbitration, which employs judicial procedure and issues a verdict that the parties have committed themselves beforehand to accept. Mediation is best thought of

as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot find by themselves. To accomplish its purposes, mediation must be made acceptable to the adversaries in the conflict, who must in turn cooperate diplomatically with the intervenor. But mediators often meet initial rejection from the conflicting parties; thus their first diplomatic effort must be to convince the parties of the value of their services before the mediation process can get started.

While mediation is designed to help conflicting parties find their own solutions, not all conflicts can be mediated, any more than are all conflicts negotiable. Parties who demand the suicide of their opponent as the necessary ingredient of a solution are unlikely subjects of mediation. Thus total absolute terrorists (e.g., suicide bombers), as opposed to contingent terrorists (e.g., hostage takers), can be considered beyond mediation, as well as negotiation.² On the other hand, the mediator's (and negotiator's) challenge is to turn nonnegotiable positions into something negotiable, and many demands that start as absolutes turn out to be flexible under negotiation (and mediation).

THE MEDIATOR'S MOTIVES

States use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. Their intervention as mediators is legitimized by the goal of conflict reduction, which they typically proclaim. The desire to make peace, however, is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of competitive politics. To understand these motives, it is most helpful to employ a rational-actor approach, using cost-benefit considerations. Mediators are players in the plot of relations surrounding a conflict, and so they have an interest in its outcome; otherwise, they would not mediate. In view of the considerable investment of political, moral, and material resources that mediation requires and the risks to which mediators expose themselves, motives for mediation must be found as much

in domestic and international self-interest as in humanitarian impulses. Mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated. Not surprisingly, they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own interests, even though mediators' interests usually allow for a wider range of acceptable outcomes than the interests of the parties. Self-interested motivation holds for states and intergovernmental organizations, as well as for many nongovernmental actors.

Mediation by States

Mediating states are likely to seek terms that will increase the prospects of stability, deny their rivals opportunities for intervention, earn them the gratitude of one or both parties, or enable them to continue to have a role in future relations in the region. Both defensive and influence enhancing goals can be promoted through mediation, and they often blend together.³ A mediator acts defensively when a continuing conflict between others threatens its interests. An end to the conflict is therefore important to the mediator because of the conflict's effects on its relations with the disputing parties or with other international actors. For example, if two of the mediator's allies engage in a conflict, the dispute can disrupt and weaken the alliance or strain the parties' relations with the third-party mediator. A conflict between two states may also upset a regional balance or provide opportunities for a rival power to increase its influence by intervening on one side of the conflict.

In some situations, a conflict may threaten to escalate and draw in additional parties. Actors who fear such escalation and expansion may seek to reduce the conflict to avoid becoming involved in hostilities. Mediation in such cases may involve a single intervenor or it may be a collective endeavor by two or more states acting within or outside the framework of an international organization. For example, the efforts to mediate the various conflicts arising out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia involved the

European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the United Nations, the informal "Contact Group," Russia, and the United States. Even rival powers, protecting their turf, are known to have cooperated and engaged in joint mediation when they feared that continuation of a particular conflict might endanger their security (e.g., U.S.-Soviet/Russian cooperation on Laos in 1961-62, on the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and even on Kosovo in 1999).

Domestic political needs of governments also often motivate mediation. Public opinion and influential domestic groups often call for intervention to stop atrocities or alleviate suffering that accompanies conflicts. Mediation is a low-risk form of intervention in such situations, helping to protect a government from domestic critics, while also serving its foreign policy goals.

The second self-interested motive for mediation is the desire to extend and increase influence. In this case, mediation is mainly a vehicle for enhancing a state's international status and influence, or for improving relations with one or both parties. A third party may hope to win the gratitude of one or both parties in a conflict, either by helping them out of the conflict or by aiding one of them to achieve better terms in a solution than would otherwise be obtainable. Although the mediator cannot throw its full weight behind one party, it can increase its influence by making the success of the negotiations depend on its involvement and by making each party depend on it to garner concessions from the other party. Mediators can also increase their presence and influence in a region by becoming guarantors of any agreement, which necessarily includes risks and responsibilities.

Mediation by Major Powers

The United States has been the most active mediator of international conflicts since 1945.⁴ This involvement is consistent with an interest-

based explanation of mediators' motives. That Americans were involved in mediation more often than the Soviets can easily be understood if we remember the unequal extent of the two powers' spheres of influence. The Soviet sphere was limited to Eastern Europe, China, and a few additional countries that became dependent on Soviet military aid (while at the same time China broke away from the Soviet sphere). The remainder of the world, sometimes called the Free World, was considered by the United States as part of its own sphere (notwithstanding that some states in this group proclaimed themselves to be non-aligned). Although actual U.S. influence varied among these Free World states, the Soviet Union carried less influence there than did the United States. The claim made in 1971 by Andrei Gromyko, then Soviet foreign minister, that Soviet interests extend to every corner of the globe and that "there is no question of any significance that can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it" reflected ambition rather than reality. Thus, the wider sphere of U.S. influence explains why the United States mediated so many more conflicts than did the Soviets. Because the United States feared during the Cold War that conflicts would provide the Soviet Union with opportunities to intervene and expand its influence, the United States often sought to dampen conflict within the non-Soviet sphere, and mediation was an appropriate instrument to that end. As a result, U.S. diplomats and policymakers gained experience and skill in mediation, and so were increasingly solicited to play the role.

In addition, mediation appeared to be the best policy for the United States when smaller states engaged in conflict called for its support in their conflict. Fearful that support for one side in a local conflict would throw the other side into the Soviet embrace, the United States offered mediation as the least risky course. A number of historical examples illustrate these interests. U.S. mediation in the Rhodesia/

Zimbabwe conflict in 1976–79 and the Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan in 1966 were inspired by a mixture of defensive and influence-extending motives. From a defensive vantage, the United States feared that the Rhodesian conflict would provide opportunities for the Soviet Union to gain influence by supporting the African nationalists. But because the African groups concerned were already politically close to the Soviet Union and China, the U.S. mediation was also an attempt to improve relations with these groups and thus extend U.S. influence.

On occasion, Soviet actions followed the same motives. Its mediation between India and Pakistan was partly inspired by its desire to improve relations with Pakistan, a country that had hitherto been on better terms with the United States and China than with the Soviet Union. It also sought to build its prestige and establish a precedent that would justify future involvement in the affairs of the region. At the same time, there were important defensive motives for its intervention. The Indian-Pakistani conflict provided China an opportunity to extend its influence into Pakistan and thus establish a presence close to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. By reducing the conflict, this expansion would become more difficult for China.

The same pattern continues. The United States has continued to play a leading mediatory role in numerous conflicts since the end of the Cold War, despite some notable contributions by other countries in specific cases and despite its (as it became) preoccupation with fighting terrorism and its loss of some of its popularity because of the war in Iraq. The continued frequency of U.S. involvement can be attributed not only to the motives already discussed but also to the need to support mediation initiatives of other actors. Because of the United States' preeminent standing as the sole remaining superpower, parties to conflicts look to the United States as the power that can determine the outcome of the struggle

that they are engaged in by supporting them, opposing them, or being indifferent. This sometimes produces situations in which mediation efforts by other actors cannot come to closure until the United States demonstrates its support for those mediation efforts by active involvement. U.S. support (and sometimes eventual supplanting) of others' efforts in Bosnia, Sudan, Jordan, and Mozambique, among others, are examples.

The patterns of interest prompting states to mediate have not changed since the end of the Cold War and the current rise in terrorism, although the readiness of third parties to become involved and the political geography of mediatory interventions have been modified. A notable shift has been taking place in Western countries, where humanitarian concerns of public opinion have come to play a more important role in shaping foreign policies than in the past. The need to respond to domestic public opinion has sometimes led a government to intervene in foreign conflicts, including civil wars, even when they are not perceived as impinging on its security interests. Since mediation carries fewer costs for intervenors than military action, especially if pursued through international organizations, collective mediation (i.e., coordinated multiparty mediation) seems to be on the increase. Examples of such mediation include the mediations in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.

Mediation by Small and Medium-Sized Powers

Mediation by small- and medium-sized powers is also motivated by the same concerns of self-interest, some of which are also related to domestic concerns. Such interests include the possibility that a conflict may spill over into the mediator's territory; the fear that the local conflict may expand and draw in powerful external actors (India's mediation in Sri Lanka in 1986 before its military intervention is an

example of both these concerns); the reluctance to take sides in a conflict between other nations (Saudi Arabia in many inter-Arab conflicts); and the attempt to promote norms that tend to enhance the mediator's own security (the 1963 Ethiopian mediation between Algeria and Morocco and the 2000 Algerian mediation between Ethiopia and Eritrea concerning the validity of established borders).

Small- and medium-sized powers may also wish to enhance their influence and prestige through mediation. Egypt and Algeria's mediation between Iran and Iraq in 1975 was motivated by the desire to prove their usefulness to both belligerents, as well as to reduce intra-Islamic conflict. Algerian mediation between the United States and Iran in 1979 on the issue of American hostages seems to have been inspired by the hope that mediation would generate goodwill from the U.S. public toward Algeria and thus help improve relations between Algeria and the United States. This hope was related to U.S. support for Algeria's adversary, Morocco, in the Western Sahara war against the Algerian-supported Polisario movement. Other cases in which states sought to enhance their international standing through mediation stretch from India's attempt to mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s to Libya's efforts to mediate in the War of the Zairean Succession in Congo in 1998–99, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 1998–2000, and the Darfur conflict in Sudan in 2003–04.

Small and medium states have few alternative foreign policy instruments at their disposal, and mediation increases their usefulness and independence in relation to their stronger allies. Moreover, when pressed to take sides in a conflict, they, like great powers, may seek to escape their predicament by assuming the role of a mediator. In the post-Cold War era, small and medium states continue to have a role as mediator. Kenya and Zimbabwe attempted to mediate the Mozambique conflict, Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) the

Angolan conflict, South Africa the conflicts in Nigeria and Swaziland, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the conflict in Cambodia, Norway the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the civil war in Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia the conflicts in Yemen and Lebanon. Many states—including South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Costa Rica, and Colombia—consider mediation of the conflicts in their regions to be a major element of their foreign policy.

Mediation by International Organizations and NGOs

The motives of international organizations are somewhat more complex than those of states. Peacemaking is the *raison d'être* of several international organizations and is thus enshrined in their charters. Yet intergovernmental organizations are also subject to the particular policies and interests of their member states. Accordingly, the United Nations was frequently paralyzed by the Cold War and engaged in peacemaking much less than its charter suggested it should. Some of the mediation efforts that it undertook were often smoke screens to conceal the intensity of U.S. involvement (e.g., in the Arab-Israeli conflict). Regional organizations were not hindered by the Cold War to the same extent as the United Nations, although they had their own similar concerns. Because mediation requires agreement among the organizations' most influential members, as well as acceptance by the parties directly involved, regional organizations were not as active in peacemaking as they might have been.

The end of the Cold War freed international organizations from their bipolar constraints, and they rushed into mediation and conflict management. As a result, their reputations and resources became overextended and their efforts were not rewarded with the expected quick success. But the UN experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Cambodia have shown both the great possibilities for mediation by the world organization and the difficulty in

separating its role from the specific—indeed, narrow—interests and concerns of leading member states in the Security Council.

Mediation activities by regional organizations are similarly affected by state interests. The European Union's mediation efforts in the Balkans and between Israel and the Palestinians were shaped in significant measure by the desire to establish and assert a role for itself in international security matters. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been utilized for mediation in Europe and the Caucasus in fulfillment of its *raison d'être* of accommodating the security interests of Russia and the West; its High Commissioner on National Minorities has been subtly active in informal mediation. ASEAN took on new mediation roles in part to prevent conflicts in the region from becoming entangled in great-power rivalries. Some African states utilized the African Union (AU) as well as subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Intergovernmental Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) in East Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to assert their aspirations for leadership and protect their interests in regional conflicts, but also to use the mediation challenge to reinvigorate the organizations and assert their relevance in the continent.

Nonstate mediators, whose interests are not as apparent or suspect as the primary players of power politics, nevertheless share motives of self-interest. At the very least nonstate mediators have a role and a reputation to establish or defend and thus an interest in appearing as good and successful mediators. (The concerns of the World Council of Churches and the All-Africa Conference of Churches in launching their mediation of the Sudanese civil war in 1971 is an interesting example, as is the highly motivated work of the Vatican in 1978–84 in mediating the Beagle Channel

dispute and of the Community of Sant'Egidio in mediating in Mozambique and Algeria.⁵ Often this role extends beyond mediation to become an organizational interest in establishing a presence and in keeping the organization clean and ready for other functions. In this regard, nonstate mediators come very close to state mediators in the nature of their interests.

Concern for peace as a value in and of itself, suspicion of interested mediators' motives, and perception of the inherent limitations on states' mediating roles have led a variety of nonstate actors to propose themselves as international mediators. Many of these are interested in a particular outcome, not because it affects them directly, but because they believe in its inherent desirability. Thus, the several private agencies striving for usefulness in the Rhodesian and Liberian civil wars were working to find an acceptable path to Zimbabwean independence and to a new political system in Liberia, respectively, not some other outcome. All nonstate actors have an interest in enhancing their positions as useful third parties, not out of any venal egotism but because they believe they have something to offer; furthermore, a reinforcement of their standing and reputation helps them do their job.

THE PARTIES' MOTIVES IN ACCEPTING MEDIATION

Opponents in a conflict face two interrelated questions: whether to accept mediation and, if so, whose offer of mediation to accept. Parties accept intervention because they, like mediators, expect it to work in favor of their interests.⁶ The most obvious motive is the expectation that mediation will gain an outcome more favorable than the outcome gained by continued conflict—that is, a way out. The parties also hope that mediation will produce a settlement when direct negotiation is not possible or will provide a more favorable settlement than can be achieved by direct negotiation. Although the adversary may not have

a similar assessment, it may accept and cooperate with the mediator if it feels that rejection might cause even greater harm—for example, damaging relations with the would-be mediator, decreasing the chances for an acceptable negotiated outcome, or prolonging a costly conflict. Such considerations sometimes help to induce states to accept intervention even in domestic conflicts (e.g., Sri Lanka's acceptance of India's and then Norway's mediation, Angola's acceptance of U.S. mediation, and Sudan's acceptance of external mediation to end the insurgency in the South). The parties may also accept mediation in the hope that the intermediary will reduce some of the risks entailed in making concessions and the costs incurred in conflict, protecting their image and reputation as they move toward a compromise. They may also believe a mediator's involvement implies a guarantee for the final agreement, thus reducing the danger of violation by the adversary.

The acceptance of mediation by international organizations can also be premised on the ability of these organizations to bestow normative approval, rather than on their capacity to influence the adversary or arrange for a satisfactory compromise. This factor is present in the case of the United Nations but is perhaps clearest in the case of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC's ability to offer an improved image to a fighting or detaining authority can be a powerful incentive for the parties to accept its presence and services and to accede to its proposals.

Partiality and Acceptability

If the acceptance of mediation is based on a cost-benefit calculation, then the assumption that mediators must be perceived as impartial needs to be revised.⁷ The mediator's impartiality is not as important to the adversaries' decision to accept mediation as is their consideration of the consequences of accepting or rejecting mediation: How will their decision affect the prospects of achieving a favorable

outcome? And how will it affect their future relations with the would-be mediator?

Initially, third parties are accepted as mediators only to the extent that they are seen as capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes; then, their subsequent meddling is tolerated because they are already part of the relationship. Although there is no necessary relationship between a mediator's past partiality and its future usefulness, good relations between it and one of the adversaries may in fact be an aid to communicating, to developing creative proposals, and to helping the two parties' positions to converge. Closeness to one party implies the possibility of "delivering" it. The party closer to the mediator may soften its stand for the sake of preserving its favored relationship with the would-be mediator. The other side, which does not enjoy close relations with the mediator (and especially if it is the weaker side), sometimes perceives the potential advantages of accepting a "biased" third party as mediator: such a mediator is more likely to be able to extract concessions from its friend than an impartial mediator who carries no particular influence with the adversary, and the other side may actually be able to ingratiate itself into the good graces of the mediator by being reasonable in making an agreement with the mediator's friend.

Several examples illustrate these points. In the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe mediation in 1976–79, the Africans' belief that British and U.S. sympathies were with the white Rhodesians rendered British and U.S. mediation promising and stimulated African cooperation. In several mediations between Arab parties and Israel, the Arabs' belief that the close U.S.-Israeli ties would enable the United States to deliver Israeli concessions made U.S. mediation attractive to them. In the Tashkent mediation in 1966, the Soviet Union was accepted as a mediator by Pakistan, despite its close relationship with India. Pakistan perceived the Soviet Union as concerned enough about Pakistan's growing cooperation with China to want

to improve its own relationship with Pakistan and as close enough to India to bring it into an agreement. Algeria was accepted by the United States as a mediator with Iran in 1979 not because it was considered impartial, but because its ability to gain access to and facilitate the agreement of people close to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini held promise that it might help to release the hostages. Viktor Chernomyrdin was effective as a mediator with Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 because of Russia's earlier support of the Serbs.

Although they cannot fully side with one party, mediators can allow themselves some latitude in their degree of partiality. This latitude may allow them to express their preference regarding the outcome of the negotiation. In the Zimbabwe and Namibia negotiations, the United States was not indifferent to the nature of the settlement: the outcome had to open the way for majority rule. Although this meant that the United States supported the essence of the African position and, by implication, sought to eliminate the white settlers as a sovereign political actor, the white settlers nevertheless accepted U.S. mediation as a means to get them out of a no-win situation.

An interest in specific outcomes is quite common in the mediations of international organizations. The United Nations, the OAU, the ICRC, and the Organization of American States (OAS) all have some general norms that they wish to uphold beyond the principle of peaceful settlement. They try to promote solutions that can be interpreted as compatible with the standards of the Geneva Conventions and of their charters and that protect their image as guardians of these standards. Indeed, they can formally condemn parties for deviating from these standards as a means to enforce them. The European Union, trying to mediate a settlement of the disputes arising out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, and concerned about the impending dissolution of the Soviet Union, enunciated the principle of the inviolability of internal borders

within states, equating their status to that of international borders. On the other hand, the OAU was so strongly attached to the principle of successor state integrity that it was incapable of mediating the Biafran or Namibian conflict, so strongly attached to the principle of *uti possidetis* (legitimacy of inherited boundaries) that it was unable to mediate the Ogaden war, and so strongly attached to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs that it was unable even to constitute a commission to mediate the Sudanese and Rwandan civil wars.

Independent nonstate agencies, such as the ICRC or the Community of Sant'Egidio, do not have the same kind of partiality or composition problems. Nevertheless, their acceptance as a mediator is still not automatic. Conflicting parties are not concerned whether the ICRC or Sant'Egidio will perform humanitarian functions objectively, but whether the framework of its involvement will further their interests. Thus, states may deny that an armed conflict that would justify an ICRC intervention is occurring or has occurred or that a Sant'Egidio venue for dialogue is appropriate. Yet the legal framework is sometimes subject to negotiation, and the terms of involvement can be influenced by their perceived effect on the interests of the parties, rather than by the latter's perception of the mediator's impartiality. Mediators must be perceived as having an interest in achieving an outcome acceptable to both sides and as being not so partial as to preclude such an achievement. Again, the question for the parties is not whether the mediator is objective, but whether it can provide an acceptable outcome.

TIMING OF MEDIATION

Since mediators are motivated by self-interest, they will not intervene automatically, but only when they believe a conflict threatens their interests or when they perceive an opportunity to advance their interests. Such threats and opportunities are unlikely to be noticed when

there is a mild disagreement between parties. Usually, it is only after the conflict escalates that its implications are perceived. By then, the parties are likely to have become committed to their positions and to a confrontational policy, ever reducing the common grounds on which mediation must proceed. For that mediation to succeed, the parties must be disposed to reevaluate their policies.

Two conditions for such ripeness for mediation are especially conducive to such reevaluation: mutually hurting stalemates and crises bounded by a deadline or, to use a metaphor, plateaus and precipices.⁸ A mutually hurting stalemate begins when one side realizes that it is unable to achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; the stalemate is completed when the other side reaches a similar conclusion. Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead end that it has reached. Both sides must see this plateau not as a momentary resting ground, but as a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or graceful escape.

Mediation plays upon the parties' perceptions of having reached an intolerable situation. Without this perception, the mediator must depend on persuading the parties that breaking out of their deadlock is impossible. Indeed, the mediator may even be required to make it impossible. Thus, deadlock cannot be seen as a temporary stalemate, to be easily resolved in one's favor by a little effort, a big offensive, a gamble, or foreign assistance. Rather, each party must recognize its opponent's strength and its own inability to overcome that strength, as well as the cost of staying in the stalemate.

For the mediator, this means cultivating each side's perception that its unilateral policy option—to take action without negotiation—is a more expensive, less likely way of achieving an acceptable outcome than the policy of negotiation. A plateau is therefore as much a matter of perception as of reality for the par-

ties and as much a subject of persuasion as of timing for the mediator. Successful exploitation of a plateau shifts both sides from a combative mentality to a conciliatory mentality.

A crisis, or precipice, represents the realization that matters are swiftly becoming worse. It implies impending catastrophe, such as probable military defeat or economic collapse. It may be accompanied by a policy dilemma that involves engaging in a major escalation, the outcome of which is unpredictable, or seeking a desperate compromise that threatens one side as much as the other. It may also be a catastrophe that has already taken place or has been narrowly avoided. Whatever its tense (because parties are bound to disagree about the inevitability of an impending event), it marks a time limit to the judgment that "things can't go on like this."⁹

For the mediator, the crisis as precipice should reinforce the dangers of the plateau, lest the parties become accustomed to their uncomfortable deadlock. Mediators can manipulate stalemates and crises: they can use them and they can make them. If there is a recognized impending danger, mediators can use it as a warning and as an unpleasant alternative to a negotiated settlement. And if they do not agree that a crisis exists, mediators can work to implant a common perception that it or a mutually hurting stalemate does exist. In its most manipulative role, a mediator may have to create a plateau or a precipice, usually citing pressure from a fourth party. That is what the United States did in 1977 to get the Namibia negotiations started, citing irresistible pressure for sanctions if the sides did not start talking, or in 2002 to get the Sudanese negotiations restarted, citing pressure from domestic Christian groups in the United States and antiterrorist policy needs that would force it to adopt a harsher policy if serious negotiations did not begin.

Plateau and precipice are precise but perceptual conditions, and they have governed the timing of successful mediation in most

cases. They are not self-implementing: they must be seen and seized. Unfortunately, they depend on conflict and its escalation. It would be preferable if the need for a ripe moment could be combined with the desirability of treating conflict early, as sought in preventive diplomacy. To do this, mediators need to develop a perception of stalemate at a low level of conflict, or to develop a sense of responsibility on the part of a government to head off an impending conflict, or to develop an awareness of an opportunity for a better outcome made available through mediation. There are few examples, as yet, of mediators using such tactics successfully.

MODES OF MEDIATORS

Mediators use three modes to marshal the interests of all the involved parties toward a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict—communication, formulation, and manipulation, in that order. Since mediation is helping the parties to do what they cannot do by themselves, each of these three modes refers to a different level of obstacle to the conduct of direct negotiations.

The mediator can serve as communicator when conflict has made direct contact between parties impossible, thereby preventing the parties from talking to each other and from making concessions without appearing weak or losing face. In this situation, mediators simply act as a conduit, opening contacts and carrying messages. They may be required to help the parties understand the meaning of messages through the distorting dust thrown up by the conflict or to gather the parties' concessions together into a package, without adding to the content. This role is completely procedural, with no substantive contribution by the mediator, and in its simplest form it is completely passive, only carrying out the parties' orders for the delivery of messages. Tact, wording, and sympathy, mixed in equal doses with accuracy and confidentiality, are necessary character

traits of the mediator as communicator. Norwegians in Oslo rarely exceeded the role of communicator if they took any part in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 1993.

The second mode of mediation requires the mediator to enter into the substance of the negotiation. Since a conflict may not only impede communications between parties, but be so encompassing that it prevents them from conceiving ways out of the dispute, the parties need a mediator as formulator. Formulas are the key to a negotiated solution to a conflict; they provide a common understanding of the problem and its solution or a shared notion of justice to govern an outcome. Just as the conflict often prevents the parties from finding imaginative ways out, it may also prevent them from seeing the value of the mediator's suggestions at first hearing. Therefore, the mediator as a formulator often needs to persuade the parties, as well as to suggest solutions to their disputes. Persuasion involves power and therefore requires greater involvement than mere communication. Not only does the mediator get involved in the substance of the issue, but it must also lean on the parties—albeit in the subtlest ways—to adopt its perceptions of a way out. Mediators as successful formulators must be capable of thinking of ways to unblock the thinking of the conflicting parties and to work out imaginative ways to skirt those commitments that constrain the parties.

The third mode requires the mediator to act as a manipulator. This is the maximum degree of involvement, requiring the mediator to become a party to the solution if not to the dispute. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict and into resolution. When the obstacle to agreement is the seemingly paltry size of the outcome, the mediator must persuade the parties of its vision of a solution; it must then take measures to make that solution attractive, enhancing its value by adding benefits to its

outcome and presenting it in such a way as to overcome imbalances that may have prevented one of the parties from subscribing to it. The mediator may have to go so far as to improve the absolute attractiveness of the resolution by increasing the unattractiveness of continued conflict, which may mean shoring up one side or condemning another, either of which actions strains the appearance of its own neutrality. This is the role of the "full participant," such as U.S. diplomats played in the 1970s' Middle East peace process, in the 1980s' Namibian-Angolan negotiations, and in 1995 in ending the Bosnian war.

Mediation is a triangular relationship. When the mediator operates as a communicator, it operates as a bridge between two contestants, or as a pump on the conduit between them. As a formulator, the mediator assumes a position of greater activity, one from which pressures and messages emanate as well as pass through. As a manipulator, the mediator becomes so active that it calls into question the triangular relationship. It may even unite the two adversaries in opposition to the mediator; for example, in the Yemen civil war (1962–70) the two sides resolved their differences in order to oppose Egyptian interference, when Egypt was acting more as an intervenor than as a mediator. But the mediator, by throwing its weight around, threatens and is threatened by the possibility of turning the triangle into a dyad. The mediator's threat to side with one party may bring the other party around, for fear that mediation might end and with it any possibilities for a solution. As a threat to the mediator, each party may try to win the mediator over to its own side to increase its chances of winning rather than of having to come to terms. At the same time, of course, each party may regard the mediator with high suspicion as a potential ally of the other side. Although it makes the mediator's job more difficult, suspicion is good because it keeps the mediator honest and aware of the disputants' concerns

POWER IN MEDIATION

Power—the ability to move a party in an intended direction—is often referred to in mediation as "leverage." Although leverage is the ticket to mediation, mediators tend to remain relatively powerless throughout the exercise. The extent of the mediator's power depends entirely on the parties, whose acceptance of a mediator depends on its likelihood (potential power) of producing an outcome agreeable to both sides. This circular relationship plagues every mediation exercise. Contrary to a common misperception, mediators are rarely "hired" by the parties; instead, they have to sell their services, based on the prospect of their usefulness and success. From the beginning, the mediator's leverage is at the mercy of the contestants. The parties, whose interest is in winning, view mediation as meddling, unless it produces an outcome favorable to each of them. They welcome mediation only to the extent that the mediator has leverage over the other party, and they berate the mediator for trying to exert leverage over them.

A mediator has five sources of leverage: first, persuasion, the ability to portray an alternative future as more favorable than the continuing conflict; second, extraction, the ability to produce an attractive position from each party; third, termination, the ability to withdraw from the mediation; fourth, deprivation, the ability to withhold resources from one side or to shift them to the other; and fifth, gratification, the ability to add resources to the outcome. In every case the effectiveness of the mediator's leverage lies with the parties themselves, a characteristic that makes leverage in mediation difficult to obtain.

The first source of leverage is persuasion. The mediator in any mode must be able to point out the attractiveness of conciliation on available terms and the unattractiveness of continued conflict, a purely communicative exercise independent of any resources. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, whose country

was not devoid of resources or the willingness to use them, nevertheless spent long hours painting verbal pictures of the future with and without an agreement for Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli audiences. President Jimmy Carter's mediation at Camp David in September 1978 and in Cairo and Jerusalem in March 1979 bore the same characteristics of the power and limitations of persuasion.

Mediation is unwelcome until it can extract a proposal from each party that is viewed as favorable by the other. This second source of leverage, extraction, is the most problematic, yet it is the basis of all mediation. The crucial moment in mediation comes when the mediator asks a party's permission to try for the other's agreement to a proposal; this exchange is the heart of the formulation mode. But its success depends on the parties' need for a way out of the impasse of conflict—demonstrating the importance of the mutually hurting stalemate and the absence of attractive alternatives as elements of the ripe moment. Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker and his team shuttled back and forth between Angola and South Africa in search of attractive proposals to carry to each side, but that exchange was not forthcoming until the military conditions of 1988 made the stalemate intolerable to both sides.

The third source of leverage, termination, lies in the mediator's ability to withdraw and leave the parties to their own devices and their continuing conflict. Again, the impact of withdrawal is entirely in the hands of the disputing parties; they may be happy to see the mediator leave, but if the mutually hurting stalemate is present, they will be sensitive to the threat of leaving. However, if the mediator needs a solution more than the parties, it will be unable to threaten termination credibly. Secretary Kissinger brandished the threat in mediating the Golan Heights withdrawal in 1974 and activated it at the second Sinai withdrawal the following year. Another example comes from the 1995 Bosnia Peace Conference at Dayton.

It was only after Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the delegations on November 20, the twentieth day of the conference, that in a few hours he would announce that the conference had failed, that the parties finally resolved their remaining differences, bringing the conference to a successful conclusion.

The remaining sources of leverage use the conflict and the proposed solution as their fulcrums, thus making manipulation their primary mode of mediation. Leverage derives from the mediator's ability to tilt toward (gratification) or away from (deprivation) a party and thereby to affect the conditions of a stalemate or of movement out of it. The activity may be verbal, such as a vote of condemnation, or more tangible, such as visits, food aid, or arms shipments. The point of this leverage is to worsen the dilemma of parties rejecting mediation and to keep them in search of a solution.

The mediator might shift weight in order to prevent one party from losing the conflict because the other's victory would produce a less stable and hence less desirable situation. Such activity clearly brings the mediator very close to being a party in the conflict. Arms to Israel and Morocco, down payments on better relations with South Africa, and abstentions on UN votes are examples of U.S. shifts-in-weight during various mediation processes. The Soviet Union threatened to shift weight away from India in the Security Council debate on the Indian-Pakistani war, and Britain threatened to shift weight against the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. Threats of this kind are effective only to the degree that they are believed.

The last source of the mediator's leverage is the side payment, the subject to which the term "leverage" is usually applied. As weight shifts affect the continuing conflict, side payments may be needed to augment or enhance the outcome to one or more parties. Side payments require considerable resources and engagement from the mediators, thus they are rarely made and are certainly not the key to

successful mediation. Yet when the outcome is not large enough to provide sufficient benefits for both parties or to outweigh the present or anticipated advantages of continued conflict, some source of additional benefits is needed. Side payments may be attached to the outcomes themselves, such as third-party guarantees of financial aid for accomplishing changes required by the agreement, or they may be unrelated to the outcome itself, simply additional benefits that make agreement more attractive. The graduated aid package attached to the Israeli and Egyptian agreement to disengage in the Sinai and then to sign a peace treaty is one example. The promise to train and equip the Bosnian Federation army as an incentive to the Muslims to accept the Dayton Peace Accords is another. Sometimes the demand for side payments by the parties may be as extraneous to agreement as is their supply.

Of all these, the principal element of leverage is persuasion—the ability of the mediator to reorient the parties' perceptions. Like any kind of persuasion, the mediator's ability depends on many different referents that are skillfully employed to make conciliation more attractive and continuing conflict less so. These referents may include matters of domestic welfare and political fortunes, risks and costs, prospects of continuing conflict and of moving out of it, reputations, solidity of allies' support, world opinion, and the verdict of history.

The other basic element in leverage is need—the parties' need—for a solution that they cannot achieve by themselves, for additional support in regional or global relations, and for a larger package of payoffs to make a conciliatory outcome more attractive. Perception of this need can be enhanced by the mediator, but it cannot be created out of nothing. Side payments with no relation to the outcome of the conflict are effective only insofar as they respond to an overriding need that outweighs the deprivation of concessions on the issues of the conflict itself. Parties can be made aware of needs that they did not recognize before,

particularly when the chances of assuaging these needs seem out of reach. The provision of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, which met South Africa's need for a countervailing reward, led to the South African troop and administration withdrawal from Namibia, yet this need was not formulated during the 1970s' rounds of the mediation. Persuasion often depends on need, but then need often depends on persuasion.

What do these characteristics say about "powerful" and "powerless" mediators? The common distinction between "interested" and "disinterested" mediators is less solid than might appear. All mediators have interests, most mediators are interested in the conflict situation in some way, and "biased" mediators may even have an advantage in access to one or both of the parties. If mediation were only persuasion, or "pure" persuasion, it would not matter who practiced it, and entry into the practice would be equally open to any silver-tongued orator. But mediation is more than simple persuasion, and the basis of effective persuasion is the ability to fulfill both tangible and intangible needs of the parties. The mediator's leverage is based therefore on the parties' need for the solution it is able to produce and on its ability to produce attractive solutions from each party.

Although official mediators are usually needed to help conclude agreements between disputing parties, unofficial (i.e., nonstate) mediators may be effective persuaders and may be useful in helping to reorient the perceptions of the parties' values and opportunities. If the required mode of mediation is low—limited to communication—and the felt need for a solution is high in both parties, informal mediation may be all that is necessary to bring the parties to negotiation. However, the higher the required mode, the lower the felt needs, the more structural interests involving a third party, and the more the conflict involves states rather than nonstate actors, the less likely informal mediation can be an effective substitute for the official attention of states. Statesmen

are not necessarily better mediators, but they can provide interest- and need-related services that informal mediators cannot handle.

Unofficial mediation in Africa provides a good illustration. Textbook cases of mediation were effected by the World Council of Churches and the All-Africa Conference of Churches in the southern Sudanese civil war in 1972, and the Community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique in 1990-92 and Algeria after 1994. The church bodies widened the perceptions of opportunity among the parties and persuaded them to move to resolution. The mediators were not unbiased, having closer ties with the southern Sudanese and Mozambican rebels than with the government, and they were not without means of leverage, being able to threaten a resumption of supplies if the government broke off talks; in Algeria, all they could offer was a venue and encouragement. The stalemates that had been building over the years were reinforced by a mediator-induced perception of an attractive way out for the parties. The nonstate mediator played a major role and deserves credit for the operations; the subsequent collapse of the Sudanese agreement a decade later and the incompleteness of the Algerian *démarche* were due to other causes, not to a failed mediation. But behind the nonstate mediator in Sudan stood an international organization—the assistant secretary-general of the OAU, Mohamed Sahnoun—and behind him stood a mediator of last resort—the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie; and around the nonstate mediator in Mozambique stood an array of interested states—the United States, Russia, Italy, Portugal, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. At a number of telling points in the operation, state actors were needed because guarantees that only a state could provide were required. The loneliness of the nonstate mediator in Algeria in 1995 goes far to explain its limited success.

Nearly two decades after the Sudanese venture, another private mediation was attempted

in 1990 in a related conflict between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government. The private mediator was a former head of state, Jimmy Carter, who was perceived in the field as carrying official backing. The *démarche* responded to an appeal elicited from the parties and was carried out with dedication and skill. It failed because there was no mutually hurting stalemate and because the nature of the conflict changed during the mediation. The success of the Tigrean rebellion caused any ripeness in the previous moment to dissipate. The mediator was unable to persuade the parties of their deadlock or of their need to find a way out or to respond to any of the parties' needs for solutions, support, or side payments. Carter was in contact with heads of state in the region and obtained their sympathy and interest, even their benevolent neutrality during the mediation. But only states could have supplied the missing elements of support and side payments, and even then there was no guarantee that they would have been any more successful than Carter was, given the absence of a ripe moment.

An example of a private mediation backed by a state was Carter's intervention in Haiti in 1994. When the ruling junta refused to give up power and transfer it to the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, as demanded by the United Nations, Carter went to Haiti, persuaded the junta leaders to withdraw, and negotiated the terms of their withdrawal. Carter succeeded this time mainly because his mediation took place hours before the scheduled launch of a U.S. military invasion intended to remove the junta by force and because political credibility was added by the participation of Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and General Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Many other mediations have benefited from a reversal of the roles portrayed in the Horn and in Haiti, that is, from informal support and assistance in a mediation performed by a

state actor. In Zimbabwe, and more broadly in the Arab-Israeli dispute, many private efforts have helped strengthen the context and prepare the terrain for official mediation. Although any efforts to improve premediatory conditions make a contribution, private efforts actually to mediate in the Northern Irish, Falklands, Cyprus, and current Arab-Israeli conflicts have been notorious failures. Ripe moments and leveraged buy-offs by state mediators are the necessary ingredients, and even they may not be sufficient.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS

Mediators often pursue the double goal of stopping a war and settling the issues in dispute. They will pursue both aims, trying to end the bloodshed and to devise a settlement that is perceived to be fair by the parties involved, and thus be acceptable and durable. However, in trying to achieve these goals, mediators are often confronted with the realization that settling the conflict in a manner that is considered fair by the disputants is likely to take a long time. Mediators may therefore face a dilemma of whether or not to give priority to a cease-fire and postpone the settlement of the conflict for later. Viewed somewhat differently, the choice may be seen as one between peace (order) and justice.¹⁰ To be sure, the two objectives are closely related. A durable cessation of hostilities requires a peace settlement. Justice requires order, and order, to endure, must be just. But these are long-term historical perspectives. For mediators, the choice is immediate: What should they do next? Should they pursue both objectives simultaneously, or should they give priority to a cease-fire?

Such a dilemma has been faced by the international community seeking to mediate the conflict in Bosnia. The choice there has been perceived as one between separating the warring parties through a partition, or pursuing a settlement that will preserve the integrity of a multiethnic Republic of Bosnia and Herze-

govina. Partition has been criticized as tantamount to legitimizing territorial conquests and the consequences of ethnic cleansing, and thus rewarding aggression. Insistence on a settlement respectful of the norm of preserving the integrity of the Bosnian state has been criticized for prolonging the war and thus costing tens of thousands of additional casualties (besides the argument that it is inconsistent with the reluctance of the international community to protect the integrity of the pre-1991 multiethnic Yugoslav state).

The dilemma facing mediators in such situations is stark. What comes first—striving to protect the norm of respect for the integrity of states, trying to teach members of warring ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims; Greeks and Turks in Cyprus; southern, western, and northern Sudanese; Armenians and Azeris in Afghanistan) to coexist in peace, or saving lives by separating the groups and postponing the search for justice until later?

The sequencing has consequences. As we have seen, warring parties are more likely to settle when the continuing confrontation hurts badly and produces grave risks. A cease-fire, ending the bloodshed, is likely to ease the pain and reduce the risks. It will create a tolerable stalemate, a situation that the disputants might find preferable to the alternative of granting the concessions necessary for a compromise settlement. But cease-fires tend to be unstable and are often punctuated by wars and additional bloodshed, for example, the cease-fires between Israel and various Arab parties, between India and Pakistan, between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, and between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. Such a condition can be termed an S5 situation—a soft, stable, self-serving stalemate, the hallmark of intractable conflicts whose long history makes them so impervious to mediators' efforts.¹¹ Such stalemates and their consequences are the strongest reasons for mediating and resolving conflicts early, with sustained robust mediation where necessary.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to predict reliably which course of action will ultimately cost more—an early cease-fire that may collapse and be followed by more fighting because the conflict remains unresolved, or a continuation of a war while the search goes on for a definitive settlement of the conflict. An argument for giving priority to a cease-fire is that predictions of the near term are generally more reliable than those of the more distant future. The mediator can be certain that an ongoing war will produce casualties. The proposition that cease-fires break down, leading to the renewal of war and producing higher casualties over the long term, is far less certain. Nevertheless, the dilemma exists. To escape the dilemma, it needs to be clearly understood by all that the cease-fire or conflict management effort will be followed by equal efforts to deal with the causes of the conflict or a conflict resolution effort. In this case, the danger of falling back into conflict if the cease-fire breaks can work to perpetuate the necessary sense of ripeness.

Another dilemma is whether to facilitate an attainable settlement that violates international norms or to hold out for one that is consistent with principles of justice adopted by the international community. One might argue that mediators of international conflicts should pursue terms that are attainable, even if they are attainable mainly because they reflect the balance of power between the adversaries, rather than jointly held notions of justice. There are two important arguments against such a course of action. One is that such a settlement is unlikely to endure. One of the parties (sometimes both) will resent terms that it considers unjust and will seek to overturn them at the earliest opportunity. The other argument concerns the wider ramifications of such settlements for world order. A settlement that is inconsistent with international principles may tend to undermine their validity, creating uncertainties about the norms and thus weakening constraints on international conduct. In other words, such settlements, while appear-

ing to settle a particular conflict, may cause wider long-term damage by undermining the foundations of international peace and security. This was the dilemma repeatedly facing peacemakers in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, where horrendously brutal violence could be stopped, it appeared, but only at the cost of bringing the perpetrators into positions of power in the government. In the penultimate move, in the Lomé Agreements of 1999, that is what happened, but in the end, the perpetrators—the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—betrayed themselves by not holding to even those agreements and had to be defeated by British shock troops.

Good answers to such dilemmas would require prescience. It is possible that promoting a settlement that is perhaps attainable, but inconsistent with international norms, might cause serious long-term injury to international peace and security. Should mediators work for terms that seem attainable, provided they promise to stabilize a cease-fire, despite their corrosive long-term effects? Viewing norms as merely tentative and conditional propositions is destructive to order. But eschewing settlements that do not conform to established norms, even if doing so allows mutual slaughter to continue, is also destructive to peace and order. Such dilemmas are not new. But these and other ethical issues have become pressing for international mediators in recent years. Guidelines for resolving such dilemmas are not easy to come by.

CONCLUSION

More interest and less leverage is involved in third-party mediation than is commonly assumed. Adversarial parties and potential mediators each make an interest calculation that involves much more than the simple settlement of the dispute. Their calculations include relations among the conflicting parties and third parties and the costs and benefits of all of them in both conflict and conciliation. Leverage

comes from harnessing those interests and from the third party's ability to play on perceptions of needs, above all on needs for a solution.

Mediation acts as a catalyst to negotiation. It facilitates the settlement of disputes that parties ought to be able to accomplish on their own, if they were not so absorbed in their conflict. Mediation becomes necessary when the conflict is twice dominant: providing the elements of the dispute and preventing parties from seeking and finding a way out together. Even when it is successful, mediation can cut through only some of those layers, providing a means for the parties to live together despite their dispute—it does not provide deep reconciliation or cancel the causes of the conflict. Left again to their own instincts, the parties may well fall out of their mediated settlement, and there are plenty of cases—such as the Sudanese Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, or the Haitian Governors Island Agreement of 1993, among many others often unstudied by analysts and practitioners focusing on the moment of mediation—in which the hard-bargained agreement has subsequently fallen apart under changed conditions or revived enmities. For this reason, although the mediator is often tempted to start a process and then slip away as it develops its own momentum, it may in fact be required to be more involved in the regional structure of relations after its mediation than before. Early satisfaction with superficial results and premature disengagement by the mediator is one of the most frequent causes of failure in peacemaking. Yet the mediator must not be a crutch forever, lest it become a party to the conflict. This is the final challenge and dilemma for mediators: How to disengage from a mediating role without endangering the carefully brokered settlement.

NOTES

Adapted from "Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking," in *Resolving*

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CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPLICATIONS

Louis Kriesberg

IT MIGHT SEEM OBVIOUS THAT THE FIELD of conflict resolution, at least for Americans, has little to contribute to countering terrorist attacks against the United States or to waging other international wars. It seems wrong to negotiate with terrorists and evildoers, with or without mediators. Indeed, people working in the conflict resolution field generally do not regard negotiation or mediation to be appropriate between perpetrators of a crime and their victims. Furthermore, it is true that conflict resolution practitioners, advocates, and theorists tend to take a broader approach than they would as militant partisans of one side, which would seem to minimize their role in working with the U.S. government in a state of war.

In actuality, however, as the conflict resolution (CR) field has developed, it offers many strategies and methods that are relevant for partisans in a fight as well as for intermediaries seeking to mitigate destructive conflicts. The new developments in CR are largely responses to the changing international environment. However, they also build on ideas

from the early years of the field, as well as innovations within the field, developed as CR workers elaborate and differentiate their areas of endeavor. Furthermore, those new developments themselves actually affect the way conflicts are waged in societies and in the international system. In this chapter, the expanding and evolving CR field is depicted, then its current basic features are presented, after which the applications of CR ideas and practices to contemporary large-scale conflicts are examined, and finally, major current issues are discussed. Throughout this chapter, CR workers include academics, diplomats, workshop organizers, and heads of adversarial organizations when they analyze the CR approach or wittingly or unwittingly employ elements of it.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION FIELD

Conflict resolution has many sources in practice, theory, and research, resulting in ongoing diversity and controversy within the field. Some